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Introduction
During the last fifty years state and federal laws have prohibited numerous
types of discrimination. In the case of insurance, however, discrimination on the
basis of traits such as race, national origin, gender, and sexual orientation is not
always prohibited.1 Sometimes such discrimination is even expressly permitted by
state law, which, at least outside of the health insurance domain, is the
predominant source of law on insurance discrimination. With fifty states (plus the
District of Columbia) all regulating insurance companies, insurance antidiscrimination law varies widely. In a previous article, we empirically
demonstrated the specific contours of this variation, which exists not simply across
states, but also across lines of insurance and policyholder characteristics. In this
paper, we attempt to explain why this cross-line and cross-characteristic variation
occurs.
This inquiry is motivated by the seemingly puzzling contours of state
insurance anti-discrimination laws. For instance, why is state regulation of
discrimination in the automobile and property lines of insurance more robust than
in the cases of health, life, or disability insurance? Why are insurance companies
allowed to use gender in health insurance underwriting decisions, but not in
automobile insurance? Why do states (and the federal government) prohibit
insurers’ use of genetic information in health insurance, but hardly regulate the use
of such information for other lines of insurance?
At a high level of abstraction, the answer to these and other puzzles is
simply that laws regulating insurance discrimination represent different tradeoffs
between the “efficiency” costs of regulation and the “fairness” benefits.2 We have
little quarrel with this framing of the issue. But it is too generic to helpfully explain
or predict state law, as numerous types of efficiency and fairness arguments can be
offered in any particular case. As we showed in our earlier paper, these factors
pull in different directions and make it hard to predict when and how a state will
regulate particular forms of discrimination in a given line of insurance.
1

See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, Southern California
Law Review (forthcoming, 2014).
2
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403
(1985); Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS.
REV. 211 (2005) (“Economists can contribute to the debate [about regulating genetic information in insurance
markets] by casting the problem as a classic efficiency-equity trade-off.”).
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In this paper we narrow our discussion and focus on two types of efficiency
considerations and one fairness consideration to understand state insurance antidiscrimination laws. The first efficiency consideration involves the capacity of a
potential trait to predict policyholder losses.
Irrespective of applicable law,
insurers are not likely to discriminate among policyholders unless doing so helps
them to better predict potentially insured losses.
The second efficiency
consideration is adverse selection: prohibiting risk classification forces insurers to
charge the same premiums to individuals who pose different predicted risks.3 This
can produce adverse selection, as policyholders who know they cannot be charged
more for insurance even if they possess a risky trait may be more likely to buy
coverage because they will not pay its full price.4 Finally, the fairness benefit on
which we focus is that insurance anti-discrimination laws can prohibit carriers
from relying on characteristics that are socially suspect, thus preventing insurers
from exacerbating or trading on inequalities that exist outside of the insurance
system (loosely characterized here
as preventing insurers from illicitly
discriminating).
We argue that these three factors, standing alone, can predict much of the
cross-line and cross-characteristic variation in state insurance anti-discrimination
law. This is very surprising. One would expect that lots of the variation depends on
state specific circumstances like the preferences of the constituents regarding
questions of discrimination, the ideology of the legislature, the strength of the
insurance lobby, and a host of other socio-economic factors that are unique to each
state. As we show below, one can abstract from all these factors and still have a
pretty good understanding on what explains insurance anti-discrimination laws in
the U.S. In particular, we advance the following simple three-prong model to
understand how state legislatures strike a balance between the efficiency and
fairness considerations involved in insurance discrimination:
a) The predictive property—State legislatures will be more likely to
consider regulating (either by prohibiting or permitting) risk
3

For an overview of insurance law, including a detailed discussion of moral hazard and adverse selection, see
Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29 (2012).
4
To be sure, insurers will classify risks even without the threat of adverse selection, because competition from
other carriers will otherwise skim away the good risks. This does not represent a social cost, however, unless it
causes at least some policyholders to purchase less insurance than they would like to purchase at actuarially fair
rates.
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classification based on a characteristic (like age) if that characteristic has
predictive value for policyholder risk.5
b) The adverse selection property—State legislatures will tend to allow risk
classification to the extent that limiting such discrimination would be
likely to trigger adverse selection.
c) The illicit discrimination property—State legislatures will be more
inclined to prohibit risk classification based on a characteristic (like age)
to the extent that doing so would help combat (or appear to combat) illicit
discrimination.
These properties must be balanced against each other to determine the outcome of
state laws.
Part I provides an overview of the adverse selection, illicit discrimination,
and predictive property arguments regarding risk classification. Part II describes
briefly the empirical approach that provides the backbone and evidence for this
paper. Part III then reviews various cross-line and cross-characteristic variations in
state insurance laws that are difficult to explain. It then applies the model detailed
above and in Part I to explain much of this variation.
Part I: Overview
A. Insurers’ Usage of Policyholders’ Characteristics
Laws forbidding the use of a characteristic in underwriting may be hard to
justify if insurers are not actually discriminating among policyholders on the basis
of that characteristic.6 To some extent, though, this depends on why insurers are
not using the relevant characteristic.
First, if insurers do not use a rating characteristic because it has no apparent
predictive value, then the case for legally restricting the use of this characteristic is
5

State legislatures therefore tend to not regulate risk classifications when insurers have anyway no economic
incentives to do it because the characteristics convey no relevant information for that line of insurance. An example
for that is sexual orientation in automobile insurance.
6
Evidence suggests that states often do pass coverage mandates that have no practical effect because all known
insurance plans are consistent with those mandates. See Amy Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health
Insurance Content Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139 (2012).
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extremely weak. Insurers are unlikely to ever use a characteristic with no
predictive power in underwriting, meaning that the only social benefit such a law
might provide is to articulate a moral commitment to a principle. But such a law
could produce potentially meaningful social costs in the form of the public cost of
legislating and the private cost of policing compliance.7
Second, the case for regulation may be slightly stronger when the reason that
carriers do not use a policyholder characteristic is because the cost of determining
and verifying the characteristic outweighs the benefits of a more refined
classification scheme. 8 Here, a plausible case can be made for laws restricting
insurers’ usage of characteristics that are predictive of risk, but nonetheless not
used because of the cost to insurers of evaluating that characteristic: even though
insurers are not currently employing the troubling characteristic in their
underwriting, this may change as the composition of the population or cost of
collecting accurate policyholder information changes. Legal prohibitions on risk
classification can therefore be justified as a mechanism for preventing potentially
problematic insurer behavior in the future.
Finally, the case for regulation is relatively strong if insurers are refraining
from using problematic policyholder characteristics because they fear the potential
reputational or regulatory consequences of doing so.9 There is good evidence that
this occurs. For instance, both auto and life insurers often do not take into account
policyholder occupation, even though this characteristic has been shown to predict
claims and is relatively easy for insurers to determine.10 Similarly, long term care
insurers do not generally take into account gender, even though this has a
7

It is a common critique of expressivist theories generally that they provide a compelling argument for action
only when they happen to coincide with some other type of argument, such as an efficiency or distributive fairnesstype argument. Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 PENN. L. REV. 3163
(2000). Compliance costs may exist even if insurers are not using the underlying risk characteristic, because the
carrier must expend funds confirming that this is not the case.
8
See generally Amy Finkelstein & James Porterba, Testing for Adverse Selection with “Unused Observables”
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12112, 2006) (noting that insurers often do not use
policyholder characteristics in underwriting even though these characteristics have predictive value, and offering
various potential explanations for this phenomenon).
9
See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 8. Finkelstein and Porterba note a fourth potential explanation: that the
predictive content of characteristics such as place of residence may be limited by the extent to which such
characteristics are subject to change in response to characteristic-based pricing differentials. As they note, however,
this is unlikely to be a substantial factor in most cases because the difficulty of changing the underlying
characteristic will generally be larger than the potential insurance benefits of doing so.
10
See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 8, at 21.
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substantial impact on claims experiences.11 Evidence that smaller and newer firms
have been more willing than established firms to introduce rating innovations
suggests that this behavior is partially explained by the fear of public or regulatory
backlash; newer and smaller firms are likely to be less deterred by the prospect of
reputational or market backlash as a result of risk classification innovation. 12 In
these cases, laws explicitly limiting insurers’ ability to employ the suspect
characteristics have the benefit of reducing regulatory uncertainty. Of course, a
coherent argument can be made that regulation in these settings in neither
necessary nor wise: when norms and reputation are sufficient to constrain private
behavior, it may be best for law to avoid intervention because of the risk that it
may “crowd out” those norms.13
B. Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is a familiar potential efficiency cost of legal restrictions
on insurers’ risk-classification practices. Indeed, some commentators label adverse
selection resulting from legal restrictions on insurers’ risk classification practices
as “regulatory adverse selection.”14 Such regulatory adverse selection stems from
the fact that legal restrictions on insurers’ risk classification practices force them to
charge the same premiums to high-risk policyholders who possess the illicit trait
and low-risk policyholders who do not. This, in turn, can cause high-risk
policyholders who cannot be charged more for insurance even though they possess
a risky trait to be more likely to buy coverage because they will not pay its full
price.15 If this occurs, then insurers may respond by charging low-risk individuals
premiums that are too high for their risk. Anticipating this sort of inaccuracy in
pricing, low-risk individuals may exit the risk pool and opt not to purchase
insurance coverage at all, leaving only higher risk (and more expensive) insureds.

11

See Jeffrey Browne & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance In The United
States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. R ISK & INS. 5 (2009).
12
See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 8.
13
See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000); Larry E.
Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 568-71 (2001).
14
See Hoy & Ruse, supra note2, at 245.
15
To be sure, insurers will classify risks even without the threat of adverse selection, because competition from
other carriers will otherwise skim away the good risks. This does not represent a social cost, however, unless it
causes at least some policyholders to purchase less insurance than they would like to purchase at actuarially fair
rates.
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Increasingly substantial empirical research demonstrates that this threat is more
contingent on the characteristics of particular insurance markets than has
traditionally been assumed. 16 Some insurance markets are quite susceptible to
adverse selection, while others are resistant to adverse selection even if regulations
substantially limit the capacity of insurers to classify risks.17 For these reasons, a
central consideration in determining the desirability of risk-classification
restrictions is the extent to which such rules are likely to generate adverse selection
“on the ground.” At least eight factors are relevant to determining if riskclassification regulation creates a real danger of adverse selection.
First, rules limiting insurers’ ability to classify risks are less likely to
generate adverse selection when the percentage of high-risk individuals is small
relative to the population of potential insureds. 18 In such cases, compelling
insurers not to discriminate against high-risk individuals will result in only a small
increase in actuarially-fair pooled premiums, as the characteristics of all
policyholders will, on the aggregate, be quite similar to the characteristics of the
low-risk policyholders. As such, low-risk individuals will be unlikely to opt out of
the insurance pool because the value they derive from complete coverage is larger
than this minimally increased cost. Nor will rival firms attempt to appeal to lowrisk individuals by offering incomplete insurance coverage because they can
anticipate that such efforts will ultimately prove unprofitable.19 Notably, the effect
of regulation may be small in these cases, if even in the absence of regulation

16

Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224
(2004) (showing that such death spirals are quite rare and that, in many cases, adverse selection is itself uncommon).
In a recent update and extension of this article, Siegelman and Cohen find more mixed evidence of adverse selection
in insurance markets, concluding that the phenomenon varies substantially across different lines of insurance and
even within particular insurance lines. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance
Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010).
17
Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Adverse Selection: An Economic Approach to the Law of Insurance
Underwriting, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 435 (2002) (using computer modeling to show the extent to which adverse selection
depends on numerous factors in the underlying insurance market).
18
See Hoy & Ruse, supra note 2, at 249-69; see also Chandler, supra note17, at 498 (making similar point by
noting that homogeneity of risks in the underlying pool decreases the prospect of adverse selection, whereas
heterogeneity increases this risk).
19
This result is predicted by the Wilson Foresight model. In the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz model, there is
actually no equilibrium when the number of high risk individuals is sufficiently low, because firms in that model do
not exhibit foresight about future risks. They consequently attempt to generate a separating equilibrium in a manner
that ultimately proves unprofitable. Anticipating this result, carriers in the Wilson Foresight do not attempt to
disrupt the pooling equilibrium. See Charles Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information,
16 J. ECON. T HEORY 167 (1977).
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insurers would choose to not discriminate against the small number of high-risk
individuals because the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. 20
Second, adverse selection is less likely to result from restrictions on risk
classification when the expected costs of policyholders possessing that forbidden
characteristic are only slightly higher than the expected costs of other
policyholders.21 For instance, if men are only 1% more likely to be in car accidents
than women, then legal restrictions on the capacity of auto insurers to discriminate
on the basis of gender will be unlikely to generate substantial adverse selection.
The explanation for this effect is the same as above: the impact of such laws on
the premiums charged to “low-risks” will be limited. Consequently, relatively few
low-risks will drop coverage and the impact of those that do will have minimal
feedback effects.22
Third, risk-classification regulation is not likely to produce adverse selection
when the purchase of minimum insurance policies is legally mandated.23 In these
settings, low-risk individuals are legally compelled to remain within the insurance
pool and cross-subsidize high-risk individuals. 24 Prominent examples of laws
requiring individuals to purchase insurance include automobile liability insurance
and health insurance under the Affordable Care Act.
Fourth, adverse selection is unlikely to result from legal restrictions imposed
on insurers’ risk-classification practices when policyholder demand for insurance
is relatively inelastic. In such cases, policyholders will tend not to drop out of the
insurance market notwithstanding increases in the price of coverage caused by
20

See supra Part I.B.7.
Does Hoy make this point? If not, is this point in the literature at all? [Find cites]
22
When the use of the characteristic has only minimal effects, of course, the insurers are less likely to use the
characteristic in the first place, which means that the benefits of risk-classification restrictions are likely to be low.
23
See, e.g., Baker, infra note35, at 380.
24
Significantly, this strategy represents the core explanation for the “individual mandate” in the Affordable
Care Act, which compels most individuals to purchase “minimum essential coverage.” Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, § 1501(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010); Id. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A. However, using an
individual mandate or similar tool to combat adverse selection poses several complications. Such a system must be
designed to police the minimum coverage floor effectively so that carriers cannot “classify by design” by offering
stripped-down coverage to low-risk policyholders. It also must preclude carriers from classifying by design in other
ways, such as by offering additional coverage that affirmatively appeals only to low-risk individuals. See, e.g., Amy
Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform By Dumping Sick Employees, 97 VA.
L. REV. 125, 158-62 (2011) (describing specific strategies by which employers complying with the PPACA may still
be able to “dump” high-risk employees on to insurance exchanges but continue to cover low-risk employees).
Finally, it must limit the capacity of carriers to design their marketing and sales strategies to target presumptively
low-risk individuals. Id.
21
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risk-classification regulation. Inelastic demand is a general phenomenon that can
be attributable to a variety of factors. For instance, it is more likely in settings
where minimal levels of insurance are practically required, as in the case of
homeowners insurance, which mortgagees generally require as a condition of a
loan.25 Alternatively, demand may be more inelastic where the cost of insurance
can be largely passed on to others. Thus, doctor demand for medical malpractice
insurance may be inelastic if premium costs are principally borne by patients and
their health insurers.26 And, of course, inelastic demand may simply reflect the
fact that individuals are very risk averse.27
Fifth, risk-classification restrictions are less likely to generate adverse
selection when high-risk policyholders cannot over-insure.28 In some settings, most
notably life insurance, insurance coverage is non-exclusive, meaning that
individuals can own multiple different policies and the benefits owed under one
policy are not impacted by the existence of other policies. 29 In these cases,
standard requirements that individuals insure only up to their economically
insurable interest may not effectively restrict the capacity of policyholders to enjoy
25

Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1320 (2011).
See Baker, infra note35, at 381; Mark Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60
DEP AUL L. REV. 539 (2011).
27
See Chandler, supra note17.One special case of inelastic demand, and thus decreased adverse selection risk,
may occur in settings where individuals face substantial “classification risk,” or what we call here “insurability
risk.” Insurability risk reflects the prospect that a policyholder’s future premiums will increase or that coverage will
become unavailable as a result of insurers’ classification efforts. Although the term classification risk is used in the
literature, see, for example, Pierre-André Chiappori, Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric
Information, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 365, 365–94 (G. Dionne, ed., 2000), a more accurate term might be
“insurability risk,” since the worry is that an individual will be classified as uninsurable. Chandler focuses on the
prospect that an individual will not be able to secure health insurance after the occurrence of a health event. But this
issue is more general, and occurs in any insurance market where policyholders retain some classification risk as a
result of loss, such as homeowners and auto insurance. Although the term classification risk is used in the literature,
see, for example, Pierre-André Chiappori, Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information, in
H ANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 365, 365–94 (G. Dionne, ed., 2000), a more accurate term might be “insurability risk,”
since the worry is that an individual will be classified as uninsurable. Chandler focuses on the prospect that an
individual will not be able to secure health insurance after the occurrence of a health event. But this issue is more
general, and occurs in any insurance market where policyholders retain some classification risk as a result of loss,
such as homeowners and auto insurance.
28
Hoy & Ruse, supra note 2; Chapter 6. See Hoy & Polborn, , at 235–252 (“The fundamental difference
between life insurance and other insurance policies is, from an institutional point of view, that individuals can buy
life insurance from as many companies as they want and therefore price–quantity contracts are not a feasible means
against adverse selection; insurance companies can only quote a uniform price for all life insurance contracts. A
second important difference between life insurance and other insurance is that there is no natural choice for the size
of loss.”).
29
In most insurance contexts, policies contain coordination of benefits or “other insurance” provisions, which
prevent a policyholder from recovering under multiple policies in a way that would improve the policyholder’s
financial condition as a result of the loss.
26
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a windfall in the event of a loss.30 For this reason, life insurance policyholders can
effectively multiply the impact of their high-risk status on the pool, resulting in
low-risk individuals being forced to shoulder a larger burden as a result of riskclassification restrictions.31
Sixth, the risk of adverse selection is smaller when a secondary market for
insurance policies does not exist, a factor whose importance has seemingly escaped
attention in the risk-classification literature. In life insurance and annuity markets
policyholders can, and frequently do, sell their policies to investors. 32 These
secondary markets increase the risk of adverse selection by allowing high-risk
individuals not merely to purchase a policy with an expected net benefit—the fifth
advantage mentioned above—but instead they allow such individuals to purchase a
policy with an immediate guaranteed profit. An individual with a genetic
predisposition need merely purchase life insurance coverage and then sell this
coverage to a third-party investor, who will pay some portion of the expected
recovery to the policyholder in return for becoming the policy owner. While
individuals have an incentive to hide their genetic defects from insurers, they have
the opposite incentive when selling policies to third-party investors: the sooner the
policyholder is to die, the more investors will be willing to pay for the policy. 33
Not only do secondary markets increase the prospect of adverse selection by
transforming expected values into assured values, they also allow high-risk
individuals to benefit personally from their life insurance products. Without such
markets, high-risk individuals could only benefit their heirs by purchasing
additional insurance, which might limit the adverse selection risk.34

30

At least when policyholders do not face any financial constraints on purchasing excess coverage. See
Chandler, supra note17, at 454-55 (noting that some insurance is sufficiently expensive that even if policyholders
were legally entitled to over-insure, many would be unable to do so because of liquidity constraints).
31
Life insurers do have ways of limiting over-insurance of this sort. In their applications, they usually ask
whether the applicant already has life insurance coverage and, if so, how much and with what insurer. Presumably
the insurer considering the application takes into account the problem of over-insuring, and its implications for
adverse selection and moral hazard, when deciding whether to issue a policy to such an applicant.
32
See generally [Find cites]
33
Risk classification rules that would prevent investors from asking about individuals’ genetic makeup cannot
prevent such transactions because these rules would not stop high-risk policyholders from volunteering information
about their genetic predispositions.
34
One potentially interesting twist here is that by over insuring and selling a policy to investors, an individual
could potentially buy better medical care that may eventually save their lives. This possibility may tend to work
against the risk of adverse selection. [Find cites]
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Seventh, product design can substantially impact the risk of adverse
selection. In some cases, product design can counteract the risk of regulatory
adverse selection. One setting where this is possible is when policyholders
typically learn whether they are high-risk at some point after they have the
opportunity to purchase coverage, as may occur with health status or genetic
predispositions (as opposed to race or gender). In these cases, policyholders who
discover they are low risk can drop coverage, leaving behind a disproportionately
high-risk pool. Insurers can counteract this threat through effective policy design,
such as by requiring policyholders to pre-pay for future coverage, so that they
forfeit these payments if they leave the insurance pool once they discover they are
low risk. 35 In other cases, though, product design can increase the risk of
regulatory adverse selection. Particularly in life and health insurance markets, for
instance, insurers cannot cancel an insured’s policy once the statutorily prescribed
incontestability period has run, except for extraordinary reasons—such as proof of
outright fraud. The same is not true of other types of insurance. 36 This fact raises
the value to life and health insurance applicants of engaging in adverse selection.
Eighth, regulatory restrictions on risk classification are more likely to produce
adverse selection to the extent that policyholders both know about their own
classification status and appreciate its link to risk.37 Where these conditions are not
met, regulatory restrictions on insurer risk classification will not create information
asymmetries between policyholders and insurers, and thus cannot generate adverse
selection.38 For instance, regulatory prohibitions on the use of genetic composition
will not tend to create adverse selection if policyholders are not themselves aware
of their own genetic composition or fail to appreciate the connection between their
genetic makeup and their risk levels.
C. Fairness and Socially Suspect Characteristics

35

This is the strategy that level-premium life and disability insurance policies take, as they effectively require
pre-payment of premiums in the early stages of life before many policyholders learn their risk status based on health
developments. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9
CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 379–83 (2003).
36
An insurer that sells individually underwritten auto or non-auto liability and property policies can cancel
policies or decline to renew when the policy comes up for renewal. See ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW.
37
See Cohen & Siegeleman, supra note 16.
38
See id.
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Any type of discrimination can pose fairness problems to the extent that it
trades on individual characteristics that are socially suspect. Policyholder
characteristics can be deemed socially suspect for two related reasons. 39 First,
insurers’ use of certain risk characteristics may reinforce or perpetuate broader
social inequalities by making insurance less available or more expensive to
historically disadvantaged groups.40 For instance, insurers who charged more to
immigrant drivers would thereby perpetuate preexisting inequalities in this
country. Second, risk-classification schemes may be socially suspect because they
reflect, or arise out of, preexisting social inequalities and thus cause some sort of
expressive harm, even though they do not penalize with higher rates members of
groups who are traditionally disadvantaged. As an example, we might object to an
insurer who announced that it was willing to sell annuities at better rates to
African-Americans because they tend to have a shorter life span. Unlike the first
example, this objection might persist even though the traditionally disadvantaged
group is made better off as a result of the insurer classification scheme. Here the
problem is not that a traditionally disadvantaged group is further harmer, but that
the risk-classification scheme stereotypes, or expresses an inappropriate attitude
toward the value of equal treatment.41
In many cases, of course, both types of argument can be deployed to label a
classification scheme socially suspect. At times, though, classification schemes
may be socially suspect based only on one of these two considerations. For
instance, automobile insurance rating schemes have recently been criticized
because they may result in lower-income individuals paying higher rates.42 This
objection is principally based on the first type of argument: insurers’ rating
39

Abraham frames this category more broadly in his article, stating that a classification can be suspect for at
least four reasons: (i) it is used improperly in other fields, (ii) it is not supported by sufficient data, (iii) it
systematically works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or (iv) it perpetuates unfair disadvantages outside of
the insurance system. In general, though, none of the first three explanations seem problematic unless they are
coupled with the fourth. It is not, for instance, troubling that classification schemes systematically work to the
disadvantage of individuals with bad driving records. Similarly, Abraham himself argues elsewhere in his article
that mere inaccuracy is not, in itself, a basis for a fairness objection. See Abraham, supra note 2.
40
Although often framed in terms of fairness, this argument can also be understood in economic terms as an
externality argument: insurers impose harms on society at large by relying on certain suspect classifications.
41
See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 Penn. L. Rev. 1503 (2000) (“[E]xpressive theories tell actors—whether individuals, associations,
or the State—to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.”).
42
Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Federation of America, Lower-Income Households and the
Auto Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED.ORG, Jan. 30, 2012,
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450.
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schemes are perpetuating income inequality by requiring lower income individuals
to pay more for coverage. Indeed, it is hard to articulate an expressive harm from
insurers’ underwriting efforts because insurers generally do not explicitly rely on
policyholder income in rating policies; instead, other classification measures
simply have the impact of producing this result. By contrast, objections to the use
of gender in life insurance may tend to rely exclusively on the second type of
argument because gender-based premiums economically benefit women, whose
expected life span is longer than men. Objections to such practices must therefore
emphasize the expressive harm associated with reaffirming the relevance of
gender-based social patterns and practices.
Part II: Variation in State Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws
A. The Empirical Approach: Coding State Anti-Discrimination Laws43
To understand state law governing insurance discrimination, we investigated
how each state (as well as Washington DC) regulates insurers’ use of nine
policyholder characteristics—race, religion, ethnicity, gender, age, genetic testing,
credit score, sexual orientation, and zip code – across the five largest lines of
insurance—life, health, disability, auto, and property/casualty. This produced
2295 sets of rules (9 traits times 5 lines of insurance times 51 jurisdictions),
derived from state statutory, administrative, and judicial materials. 44 For each
state/characteristic/line combination, we then converted the applicable rules to one
of six possible codes. These codes range along a continuum, from those that are
least restrictive of insurers’ underwriting decisions to those that are most
restrictive. The entire continuum is reproduced below:45
Expressly Permit (-1)—The state has a statute expressly or impliedly
permitting insurers to take the characteristic into account.

43

This Article includes only a brief discussion of the empirical approach. For more details on how data was
selected and coded, see Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 1.
44
Judicial decisions and administrative rulings rarely impacted the coding derived from state statutes.
Surprisingly, out of the 2295 trait/line combinations (9 traits times 5 lines of insurance times 51 jurisdictions), only
16 total trait/line combinations were changed on this basis.
45
We acknowledge that this continuum from permissive to stringent restrictions is neither perfectly continuous
nor perfectly scaled, but it is the best that can be done given the nature of the data. It allows us to “see” the data in a
way that makes it more accessible.
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No Law on Point (0)—The state laws are silent with respect to the
particular characteristic.
General Restriction (1)—The state has a statute that generally prohibits
“unfair discrimination,” either across all lines of insurance or in some lines
of insurance, but that statute does not provide any explanation as to what
constitutes unfair discrimination and does not single out any particular trait
for limitation.
Characteristic-Specific Weak Limitation (2)—The state has a statute that
limits the use of a particular characteristic in either issuance, renewal, or
cancellation.
Characteristic-Specific Strong Limitation (3)—The state has a statute that
prohibits the use of a particular characteristic when the policy is either
issued, renewed, or cancelled, or the state has a statute that limits but does
not completely prohibit the use of a particular characteristic in rate-setting .
Characteristic-Specific Prohibition (4)—The state has a statute that
expressly prohibits insurers from taking into account a specific characteristic
in setting rates.
B. An Overview of Variation in the Intensity of Risk Classification Regulation
The data developed above reveal substantial variations in state insurance
antidiscrimination laws across the nine characteristics that we investigated. This is
easily seen in Chart I, which compares the average level of restrictiveness for each
characteristic, for all lines of insurance and all states combined.46 Overall Chart 1
demonstrates that race, national origin, and religion are the most heavily regulated.
All of these characteristics average more than a weak limitation (2 in our coding
scheme), which means that each of these is specifically restricted in the law on
insurance discrimination. The next most regulated characteristic is gender,
followed by sexual orientation. Age is the least restricted, averaging less than a 1
in our cording scheme, meaning that state law only prohibits unfair discrimination

46

For example, in Chart 1 the bar for race shows the average treatment for race across all 51 states and all five
insurance lines. This is a total of 255 (51 x 5) laws that are, on average, slightly less than a strong limitation (a “3”
on our coding scale).
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generically, but does not specify when or how age-based discrimination might be
impermissible.
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Chart 1
State insurance anti-discrimination laws vary not only across regulated
characteristics, but also across insurance coverage lines. Chart 2 illustrates this
cross-line variation in the intensity of risk classification regulation. It reports the
average level of restrictiveness for each line of insurance, this time averaging
together scores for all policyholder characteristics and all states. This value varies
between just more than a “General Restriction” (or numerical score of 1) for
disability insurance to just more than a Characteristic-Specific “Weak Limitation”
(or numerical score of 2) for auto and property/casualty. Thus, our data suggest
that state laws regulating risk-classification practices are the most restrictive in the
auto and property/casualty insurance lines and the least restrictive for disability and
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life insurance lines,.47 State anti-discrimination laws for health insurance fall in
between these extremes.
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Chart 2
Chart 3, below, reports the restrictiveness of state risk-classification
regulations by characteristic as well as by coverage line. It contains the same
information as in Chart 2, but with the blue bar “removed” to expose the average
scores across states for each line/characteristic combination.

47

One possible explanation for the restrictiveness of each line of insurance is that states with general restriction
statutes for a specific line of insurance may not have felt a need to pass stricter laws. However, as seen in Avraham
et al, supra note ___, at ____[Anatomy Paper], this was not a relevant factor in explaining cross-line variations.

16
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/82

16

Avraham et al.:

Mean Score per Line & Characteristic

on
outri
ght p
rohib
iti

itatio
n
stron
g lim

perm
it

life

weak
limita
tion

health

ion

disability

gene
ral re
strict

prop/cas

no-m
entio
n

auto

Race
Ethnicity
Religion
Gender
Age
Credit Score
Genetics
Sexual Orientation
Zip Code
Race
Ethnicity
Religion
Gender
Age
Credit Score
Genetics
Sexual Orientation
Zip Code
Race
Ethnicity
Religion
Gender
Age
Credit Score
Genetics
Sexual Orientation
Zip Code
Race
Ethnicity
Religion
Gender
Age
Credit Score
Genetics
Sexual Orientation
Zip Code
Race
Ethnicity
Religion
Gender
Age
Credit Score
Genetics
Sexual Orientation
Zip Code

Chart 3
Chart 3 suggests that the similarities in risk classification restrictions in auto
and property/casualty insurance extend beyond the similar aggregate measures
reported in Chart 2. Both lines of insurance seem to have a very similar pattern of
risk classification restrictions across different characteristics, as reflected in the
similar patterns of data reported in the auto and property/casualty insurance entries
in Chart III. A similar point can be made for health and life insurance, with the
exception of genetics (the green bar), age (the gray bar) and gender (the brown
line), which vary significantly in their treatment across these two lines of coverage.
Disability insurance seems to stand out as unique in its pattern of risk classification
restrictions.
Chart 3 also shows that the comparatively heavy regulation of race, national
origin, and religion noted in Chart 1 exists across all lines of insurance. These
characteristics (the top 3 bars—black, red, and blue) are almost always the most
intensely restricted characteristics in every coverage line, with sometimes a full
17
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one-point difference between them and the next most restricted characteristic,
namely gender.48
In addition to adding some nuance to the data reported in Charts 1 and 2,
Chart 3 also reveals some interesting disparities in how individual policyholder
characteristics are treated across different lines of coverage. Consider policyholder
genetics, for instance, which is reported in the green bar. Chart 3 shows that 48 of
the 51 jurisdictions completely prohibit the use of genetics for health insurance,
giving genetics the highest overall restrictiveness score of any characteristic for a
single line of insurance, even though in the other four lines the mean score for
genetics is low.49 This near consensus among states regarding the use of genetic
information in health insurance is reflected in the 2008 passage of the federal
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, which forbids the use of genetic
information in health insurance.50
Genetics is not the only policyholder characteristic that is regulated
differently across different lines of insurance. Chart 3 also shows that gender (the
brown bar) is highly restricted in auto, property/casualty and disability insurance,
but only weakly restricted in health and permitted by all states in life.51 Somewhat
similarly, Chart 3 shows that credit score (the yellow bar) is more intensely
restricted in automobile and property/casualty insurance than in disability, health,
and life insurance. Finally, age (the dark gray bar) is also regulated quite different
across different lines of insurance. In health and life insurance, age tends towards
the “permitted” score, whereas age is regulated much more strongly (averaging a
weak restriction) in property/casualty and auto insurance.52 These disparities in
how individual policyholder characteristics are treated across different lines of

48

The only exceptions are restrictions on genetic traits in health insurance underwriting and restrictions on
gender in disability insurance. The “big three” phenomenon can also be seen when looking at the number of
jurisdictions that completely prohibit the use of a characteristic across all five lines of insurance. Race (9 states),
ethnicity (9 states), and religion (7 states), along with sexual orientation (5 states) and gender (one state), are the
only characteristics that were banned in all five lines of insurance by a state. For more on this, see Avraham, Logue,
& Schwarcz, supra note 1, at __..
49
New York is the only state which allows (with heavy restrictions) insurers to use genetic testing in health
insurance. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615.
50
Pub. L. No. 110-233 § 102(b)(1)(B) 122 Stat. 881 (2008). Under the Act genetic testing is defined to include
family history of disease.
51
As noted later, federal health care reform will prohibit this practice in health insurance starting in 2014.
52
Chart 3 reveals that on average sexual orientation (pink) and zip code (light blue) are treated very similarly in
all lines of insurance. They almost always fall around the score of “general restriction.”
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coverage are explored more extensively below, where we attempt to explain them
using our model.
In summary, there are wide variations in state regulation of insurers’ risk
classification practices. Across policyholder characteristics, the most restricted
characteristics are race, ethnicity, and religion (the “big three”), and the most
restrictive combination (outside of the big three) is genetics in health insurance.
Across insurance lines, automobile insurance and property/casualty insurance are
similarly regulated, and constituted the most restrictive lines of insurance. Health
and life insurance are also similarly regulated with respect to permissible risk
classification, with health being more restrictive.
Finally, various individual
policyholder characteristics, including genetics, gender, credit score, and age, are
regulated very differently across different lines of coverage.
Part III. Explaining Variation of Characteristic/Line Combinations
This Part attempts to explain the variations described in Part II by reference
to the three factors described in Part I. As described at the outset, our basic model
suggests that state legislatures strike a balance between the efficiency and fairness
considerations involved in insurance discrimination as follows:
The predictive property—State legislatures will be more likely to
consider regulating (either by prohibiting or permitting) risk
classification based on a characteristic (like age) if that characteristic has
predictive value for policyholder risk. 53
b) The illicit discrimination property—State legislatures will be more
inclined to prohibit risk classification based on a characteristic (like age)
to the extent that doing so would help combat (or appear to combat) illicit
discrimination.
c) The adverse selection property—State legislatures will tend to allow risk
classification to the extent that limiting such discrimination would be
likely to trigger adverse selection.
a)

53

State legislatures therefore tend to not regulate risk classifications when insurers have anyway no economic
incentives to do it because the characteristics convey no relevant information for that line of insurance. An example
for that is sexual orientation in automobile insurance.
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These properties must be balanced against each other to determine the outcome of
state laws.
Section A of this Part begins with the easiest task: explaining the broad
patterns of cross-characteristics variation in the intensity of state insurance antidiscrimination law described above. Section B then attempts to explain the
patterns of cross-line variation. Finally, Section C uses our proposed model to
explain cross line variations in states’ treatment of individual policyholder
characteristics, including gender, age, and genetics.
A. Explaining Cross Characteristic Variations
The cross characteristic variation described in Chart 1 can largely be
explained by the illicit discrimination prong of our model. First, the fact that race,
national origin, and religion are the three most restricted characteristics is broadly
consistent with social judgments that discrimination on the basis of these
characteristics is socially suspect, as reflected in both federal anti-discrimination
laws and Supreme Court precedent. Thus, federal antidiscrimination laws, like
Title VII 54 (banning employment discrimination) and Title VIII 55 (banning
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing), prohibit discrimination because of
an individual’s “race, color, religion… or national origin.” Similarly,
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion has long been
subject to strict scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection
jurisprudence.56
Correspondingly, gender – the next most heavily regulated characteristic in
state insurance regulation – is subject to similar, though slightly less robust, federal
anti-discrimination protections than the big three. Both Title VII and Title VIII
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender to the same extent that they prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion. But gender only

54

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (West).
56
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §9.3 (4th ed, 2011). Protection
from religious discrimination has also been a part of the Constitution since our country’s founding. U.S. CONST.,
AMEND. I.
55
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received an intermediate level of scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s Equal
Protection jurisprudence.57
The fact that sexual orientation is the next most restricted characteristic after
gender is also broadly consistent with emerging norms about socially suspect
characteristics. To be sure, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has
not been recognized for protection by federal laws in the same way that race,
religion, national origin, and gender have been. And while the Court has implied a
willingness to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination, so far it has done so
only using rational basis review.58 Moreover, gay rights have been enjoying greatly
enhanced protections at the state level in recent years, with numerous states
passing new laws in support of gay marriage59 and prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in areas like employment.60
Age is the least regulated characteristic in state insurance law, which is a
little harder to understand based solely on the illicit discrimination prong of our
model. On one hand, discrimination on the basis of age is only subject to rational
basis review under Equal Protection analysis,61 and it is not protected under Title
VII or Title VIII. On the other hand, though, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act provides basically the same protections for age as Title VII does
for race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.62
B. Explaining Cross Line Variations
The broad patterns of cross-line variation in state insurance antidiscrimination law can largely be explained by our model, particularly the third
prong—the adverse selection property. Recall that the auto and property/casualty
insurance lines are the most heavily restricted by state anti-discrimination laws.
This is consistent with the fact that these coverage lines are relatively less
57

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government
action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”).
58
Id. at 808.
59
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/18/gay-marriage-support-hits-new-high-in-postabc-poll/ (showing 58% of Americans support gay marriage).
60
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (showing 89% of Americans agree that homosexual
men and women should have equal job opportunities, and 9 out of 10 Americans think there is already a federal law
to ensure this).
61
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 802 (4th ed, 2011).
62
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West).
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susceptible to adverse selection than other lines of coverage, giving the state more
leeway to prohibit discrimination without triggering adverse selection.
Auto and property/casualty insurance lines are relatively resistant to adverse
selection because minimum coverage levels are generally legally or practically
mandated in these lines. Automobile drivers, of course, are legally required to
carry a minimum amount of liability insurance in virtually every state. They are
also frequently required to purchase UIM coverage. Individuals who finance the
purchase of a car, which is quite common, are also commonly required to maintain
comprehensive and/or collision. Similarly, individuals who finance the purchase
of a home, which is almost all homeowners, are required by their lenders to
maintain minimum levels of homeowners insurance. Recall from Part I that when
coverage is mandated, either de jure or de facto, the risk of adverse selection is
smaller.
Just as the adverse selection property of our model can explain the relative
strength of state anti-discrimination laws in auto and homeowners insurance, it can
also explain the relative weakness of these laws in the context of life and disability
insurance. That is because life and disability insurance are comparatively quite
susceptible to regulatory adverse selection. This point is particularly compelling
with respect to life insurance for three reasons. First, life insurance may be
especially susceptible to adverse selection from asymmetric information because
individuals can relatively easily over-insure their own lives by purchasing policies
from several insurers. 63 Second, there exists a robust secondary market for life
insurance policies, allowing high-risk individuals to immediately profit with
certainty from the purchase and the immediate sale of these policies when
regulatory rules preclude accurate underwriting. Third, insurers cannot drop
insureds in life insurance because their risk has changed. Life insureds’
renewability of the policy is guaranteed until they die or decide to drop their
coverage. Thus, every high-risk insured who makes it into the pool will stay there
for long time.
63

See Hoy & Polborn, The Value of Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market, 78 J. PUB. ECON. 235
(2000) (“The fundamental difference between life insurance and other insurance policies is, from an institutional
point of view, that individuals can buy life insurance from as many companies as they want and therefore price–
quantity contracts are not a feasible means against adverse selection; insurance companies can only quote a uniform
price for all life insurance contracts. A second important difference between life insurance and other insurance is
that there is no natural choice for the size of loss.”).
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Adverse selection may also be a problem in the context of disability
insurance, though this is less clear than in the case of life insurance. The peculiar
risk of adverse selection in disability insurance stems from the fact that, relative to
other lines of coverage, disability insurance claims are low frequency, but often
involve large payouts.64 This means that a small number of high-risk individuals
can substantially skew the prices that low-risk individuals pay.65
Finally, the risk of regulatory adverse selection also seems to provide a
plausible explanation for the fact that state anti-discrimination laws in health
insurance fall in between property/casualty and auto insurance, on one end, and life
and disability insurance, on the other. This is because adverse selection concerns
with respect to the type of discrimination we investigate – which does not include
health-based discrimination – are quite nuanced in the health insurance context.
On one hand, none of the special factors applicable to life insurance apply to health
insurance markets: over-insurance is not possible, there are no secondary markets
for policies, at least until recently insurers could drop high risk insureds, and
substantial payouts are made on a comparatively large number of policyholders.
Additionally, depending on state law, health insurance carriers (until very recently)
could combat adverse selection through product design, for example by asking for
applicants’ medical history.66 Health insurance carriers also enjoy a unique ability
to sell coverage on a group basis because the tax code confers substantial tax
benefits on employer-sponsored coverage. 67 Employer-sponsored coverage
combats the risk of adverse selection without any underwriting because employees
64

American Academy of Actuaries, The Use of Genetic Information in Disability Income and Long-Term Care
Insurance, at 2 (2002), available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/genetic_25apr02.pdf.
65
This corresponds to the first adverse selection argument that there are a small number of high-risk
individuals.
66
The extent to which life and disability insurance underwriters also use product design to combat adverse
selection is unclear. To the extent that they do not request information about one’s family history of genetic disease,
the rationale for this is also unclear. What we do know is that requesting a family history of diseases is the norm in
health insurance underwriting.
67
Specifically, federal tax laws allow the full value of employer-provided health insurance to be excluded from
employees’ income for purposes of calculating their income tax liability. 26 U.S.C. §106. While life and disability
insurance are also frequently sold on a group basis, there is less bias towards group markets in these contexts,
principally because of the absence of comparable tax subsidies. Approximately 50% of life insurance policies are
sold through employers, and approximately 50% are sold through the individual market, though policies sold in the
individual market tend to be larger. Cheryll D. Retzloff, Person-Level Trends in U.S. Life Insurance Ownership,
LIMRA.COM ,
at
12
(Mar.
2011)
available
at
http://media.hbwinc.com/pdf/Person_Level_Trends_in_U.S._Life_Insurance_Ownership_2011.pdf. A substantial
majority of private health insurance is sold through employers. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 23, 30 (2001).
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are relatively heterogeneous with respect to most health-related factors, and
definitely with respect to their genetic predisposition to illness.68
On the other hand, the adverse selection prong of our model cannot fully
explain the treatment of health insurance, as regulatory adverse selection caused by
at least some of the anti-discrimination rules we isolate is a very real risk in health
insurance for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the expected costs of high
risk policyholders in the context of some anti-discrimination rules – particularly
age and gender – can be substantially larger than the expected costs of low-risk
Second, there are a potentially large number of people who
individuals. 69
constitute high-risk individuals in this context.70 All of this is consistent with the
fact that the ACA will limit discrimination on the basis of age and prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender starting in 2014. That is because the ACA
also contains and individual mandate and substantial tax subsidies, both of which
were specifically designed to limit the risk of adverse selection.
The middling level of state anti-discrimination law in health insurance
becomes more understandable, though, when the illicit discrimination prong is
added back in to the analysis. Concerns about illicit discrimination are stronger in
health insurance than in any other line of coverage, as many view adequate health
insurance to be a “right,” whereas few make similar arguments for other forms of
coverage. 71 As such, even if adverse selection concerns were as substantial in
health insurance as they are in life and disability, thus tending to lead to less state
anti-discrimination regulation, the illicit discrimination prong would tend to push
in the opposite direction, promoting stronger anti-discrimination laws. The result
would be a middling level of protection, precisely what we observe.

68

See Mark Hall & David Hyman, Two Cheers for Employer Sponsored Coverage, 2 YALE J. HEALTH P OL'Y
L. & ETHICS 23 (2002).
69
This is factor 2 discussed in Part I.A.
70
This is factor 1 discussed in Part I.A.
71
See Nowlan, infra note 78 (“[A] clear distinction exists between economic and ethical considerations
involved in underwriting health insurance and those that apply to life insurance. Life insurance in this country is not
a societal right, although everyone is potentially eligible for limited survivorship benefits through social security.”).
But see Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law &
Policy, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6 (2007) (noting that the difference in the laws may be attributable to the difference in
“social importance” that people place on health insurance over life and disability insurance, but arguing that genetic
information should be banned from disability insurance as well).
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C. Explaining Particular Cross line/Cross Characteristic Combinations
Our model does a relatively good job of explaining the broad trends in crosscharacteristic variation and cross line variation that we observe. In this section, we
show that the model also provides relatively good explanations for many of the
more specific patterns of state antidiscrimination law, wherein variation exists in
the treatment of individual policyholder characteristics are treated across different
lines of coverage.
1. Cross-Line Treatment of Genetics
As noted in Part II, and more specifically illustrated in Chart 4 below, there
is tremendous variation in the treatment of genetics across policy lines. This
variation, moreover, does not follow the more general trends in cross-line
variation: most notably, health insurance is much more strongly regulated than the
other lines. In fact, the use of genetic information in health insurance underwriting
is the most restrictive trait in our study. By contrast, Chart 4 shows that there is
very little regulation of genetics in the other lines of insurance. 72 In fact, many
states go so far as to explicitly permit the use of genetic information in other lines
of insurance (a “-1” in our coding scheme). This can be seen in life insurance, and
to a greater degree in disability insurance, which are regulated similarly with
respect to genetics. 73 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
mirrors this result at the federal level, prohibiting health insurers (and employers)
from using individuals’ genetic information, but leaving other forms of insurance
unregulated with respect to genetic discrimination.

72

New York is the only state to permit the use of genetic testing in health insurance, making it an outlier. New
York is not even consistent, also permitting genetics in life and disability insurance but restricting the use of genetics
in auto and property/casualty.
73
The main visual difference between life and disability insurance in Chart 4 is that while there are several
states which do not mention anything about the usage of genetic test in disability insurance (score 0), there are no
such states in life insurance, an as more states have the score of 1 (general restriction). That is not a major
difference.
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Chart 4: Distribution of States’ Scores for Genetic Testing, by Insurance Line

Our model does a relatively good job of explaining these patterns.74 First,
consider the treatment of genetic information in automobile and property/casualty
insurance, which is usually restricted under states’ general restriction laws
(category 1). In addition, many states do not even mention genetic information in
their laws, and only two states expressly permit discrimination based on genetic
information. These trends are consistent with prong 1 of our model, reflecting the
fact that genetic testing does not (at least yet) seem to provide information that is
predictive of expected losses with respect to auto and property/casualty insurance.
As the first prong of our model predicts, legislatures are unlikely to act when
insurance companies are not using, and are not likely to use, a specific
characteristic in their underwriting decisions.
The observed patterns in life and health insurance are also consistent with
our model. In these domains, where genetics is indeed quite predictive of risk, the
74

For other attempts to explain these patterns, see Michael Hoy & Mattias Polborn, The Value of Genetic
Information in the Life Insurance Market, J. P UB. ECON. 78 (2000); Wolf & Kan, supra note 71.
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illicit discrimination prong of our model becomes central. Genetic discrimination
in the context of health, life, and disability insurance immediately evokes Nazi
Germany and its obsession with promoting the reproduction of more “genetically
desired” people and eliminating “genetically defective” individuals. Under this
worldview, Nazis first forced those with Huntington disease to be sterilized and
later murdered them in extermination facilities.75 The United States also has a
history of forced sterilization based on supposed genetic defects.76 This history has
led to broad social protections for those with genetic conditions, and suggests that
in the health, life, and disability insurance domain, insurers’ use of genetics would
raise strong concerns about illicit discrimination on the basis of socially suspect
categories.77
At the same time, the adverse selection prong of our model is also relevant
to assessing prohibitions on insurers’ use of genetic information. This fact largely
explains why genetic discrimination is treated so differently in health insurance, on
the one hand, and life and disability insurance, on the other hand. As was
explained in the previous section on the intensity of regulation, life and disability
insurance markets are generally more susceptible to adverse selection than health
insurance markets (at least with respect to the policyholder characteristics we
studied). As such, while the illicit discrimination prong overwhelms the adverse
selection prong in health insurance, it is unable to do so in life and disability
insurance, where the efficiency argument for allowing the use of genetic
information is stronger.
This argument is enhanced by the fact that adverse selection concerns about
genetic information in the health insurance context are relatively muted for health
insurance policies purchased in individual markets. Such policies are often only in
75

Thomas Lemke, “A Slap in the Face. An exploratory study of genetic discrimination in Germany”, Genomcis,
Society and Policy. Vol 5(2) pp22-39 (2009).
76
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, PL 110–233, May 21, 2008, 122 Stat 881.
77
Standing on their own, illicit discrimination arguments are not persuasive in explaining the differential
treatment of genetic discrimination in health, on the one hand, and life and disability on the other. One might argue
that genetic risk should be prohibited as a factor for obtaining health insurance based upon the view that adequate
health insurance is a “right.” While this argument may contribute to the differences in treatment of genetic
information across insurance lines, the fact that gender and age are allowed to be taken into account in health
insurance (as we show below), suggests that the economic impact of adverse selection is a more powerful
explanation. In fact, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act specifically clarifies that “[t]he term ‘genetic
information’ shall not include information about the sex or age of any individual.” Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, PL 110–233, May 21, 2008, 122 Stat 881.
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force for a short time. Yet genetic predisposition to illness represents a long-term,
and typically a probabilistic threat. For these reasons health insurers often focus on
the short-terms risks of their policyholders and may not have an incentive to
attempt to identify such long-term risks.78
2. Cross-Line Treatment of Gender
State laws also vary dramatically across coverage lines in the extent to
which they allow insurers to take into account gender in classifying policyholders.
This is most vividly demonstrated in the domain of health insurance. As Chart 5
reveals, 18 jurisdictions expressly permit the use of gender in health insurance, and
28 jurisdictions strongly limit or expressly prohibit its use. Gender is such a
prominent issue for health insurance that every jurisdiction has addressed it in one
way or another—either with a general or a specific statute; in other words, there
are no entries in the “no-law-on-point” column of Chart 5. Starting in 2014, the
Affordable Care Act will prohibit insurers from charging higher rates due to
gender in the individual and small group insurance markets.79 Not surprisingly, the
treatment of gender in life insurance is similarly fractured.80

78

William Nowlan, A Rational View of Insurance and Discrimination, 297 SCIENCE 195 (2002).
Key
Features
of
the
Affordable
Care
Act,
By
Year,
HEALTH C ARE. GOV
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/full.html#2014 (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). Irrespective of whether this
approach is “correct” Chart 5 suggests that the Affordable Care Act can be defended on the basis that it establishes a
national policy on the issue. Even though states generally have autonomy to make their own decisions about various
issues, the federal government has long played a central role in regulating discrimination on the basis of gender. Cite
Title VII or IX
80
Chart 5 shows that 21 jurisdictions permit its use compared with 19 jurisdictions strongly limiting it and two
states, Montana and North Carolina, prohibiting it. The remaining 9 jurisdictions restrict its use. As with health
insurance, every jurisdiction has some opinion on how gender should be treated, as there are not any “no-law-onpoint” entries. And, as with health insurance, these differences raise questions not just about the “correct” approach,
but also about whether this type of variation among states should be allowed.
79
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Chart 5: Distribution of States’ Scores for Gender, by Insurance Line
The use of gender is both less polarized and more restricted in the other
three lines of insurance. For the property/casualty line, most states are on the
restrictive side of the chart, with twenty-five strongly limiting its use. 81 Not
surprisingly, state laws display a similar pattern with respect to auto insurance.82
Disability insurance is also restrictive with only Washington expressly permitting
the use of gender and twenty-six strongly limiting it.
The cross-line variation in the treatment of gender substantially matches the
more general cross-line variation described in Chart 2. Both overall and with
gender specifically, auto and property/casualty insurance received the most
restrictive scores. Similarly, life insurance received the lowest score overall and
with gender as well. The only lines for which gender differed from the average of
all nine characteristics were health and disability. As seen in Chart 2, health
insurance on average is treated more restrictively than disability insurance, but
81

Only Maryland expressly permits the use of gender and Kansas has no law on point.
Only four states (California, Delaware, Louisiana, and Maryland) permit gender’s use and twenty-two
strongly limit it.
82
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with gender the opposite is true—states are more restrictive with disability
insurance and less restrictive with health insurance.
All of this suggests that the broad explanations for cross-line variation
discussed above – which focus predominantly on adverse selection – can also
explain the more specific pattern of cross line variation found with respect to
gender. Indeed, when looking at gender and life insurance, the differences between
men and women in mortality risks are more important than is often assumed.
Although the average difference in life expectancy between men and women is
only several years, the difference in one’s chance of dying in a given year varies
greatly by gender.83 Similarly, substantial differences exist in the expected health
care costs of men and women due to the costs of child bearing, meaning that
adverse selection also a substantial risk when gender-based classification is
prohibited with respect to health insurance.84 While troubling on fairness grounds,
this makes sense because it prevents an individual from waiting until she intends to
become pregnant before enrolling in an insurance plan. If insurers cannot
discriminate on the basis of gender they may have to charge higher prices to men
relative to their (assigned) risk, causing them to drop out of the risk pool.85 This
explanation is consistent with the ACA’s ban on gender-based underwriting, as the
risk of adverse selection is largely counteracted by the incorporation of the
individual mandate in the statute. 86 By contrast, adverse selection is not a
substantial risk when state laws prohibit insurers from using gender in auto or
property/casualty insurance. In addition to coverage mandates and lender
requirements (which are explained above), this is because gender does not appear
to correlate strongly with risk in property/casualty insurance, a fact that both limits
the practical effect of the law as well as the risk of adverse selection. In the
automobile insurance context, where gender may arguably play a role, the expected
differences in risk between men and women, once other policyholder
characteristics are taken into account, may be relatively small.
83

But see Mary W. Gray & Sana F. Shtasel, Insurers Are Surviving Without Sex, 71 A.B.A. J. 89 (1985).
One way that insurance companies prevent adverse selection in the individual market is by not including
coverage for maternity costs. STILL NOWHERE TO TURN: INSURANCE COMPANIES TREAT WOMEN LIKE A PREEXISTING CONDITION, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER 3 (2009) (finding that 87% of health plans in the
individual market available to a 30-year-old woman do not provide maternity coverage).
85
Interestingly, this might have the opposite effect for women with no plans to become pregnant. Such women
would face an even greater discrepancy between their true risks and their premiums if insurers charged only women
for the expected costs of child birth than if they spread this risk among women and men.
86
See supra Part I.
84
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To the extent that the cross line variation for gender does not match the
broader patterns of cross-line variation described above, they are nonetheless
consistent with our model. In particular, the fact that health insurance is more
strongly regulated than disability insurance likely stems from the first prong of our
model: gender has a clear predictive value in life and health insurance, and
therefore it is clear why no state has left gender unregulated in these lines of
insurance. In contrast, it is not clear that gender has a predictive value in disability
insurance, which may explain why 10 states have left it unregulated. Prong 1 in
the specific context of gender thus alters the usual ordering of health and disability
insurance.
Our model is also consistent with the fact that gender is so lightly regulated
with respect to life insurance. Illicit discrimination arguments against genderbased discrimination in the life insurance context are comparatively less
compelling than in other lines. First, while gender-based discrimination increases
women’s premiums for annuities, it decreases women’s premiums for life
insurance products, so the net actual effect is likely to be small and may even be
null.87 Second, the ultimate beneficiaries of life insurance products are frequently
the spouse or children of the person insured therefore, even if discrimination were
prohibited and one gender were forced to pay systematically higher premiums than
the other gender, it is not clear that the incidence of such a premium differential
would be borne systematically by one gender or the other. Both of these points
mean that discrimination does not systematically harm or help women, and thus
that any fairness-based argument trading on the notion that gender is a socially
suspect classification category is substantially weakened.
3. Cross-Line Treatment of Age
States’ regulation of age-based classifications also varies substantially across
insurance lines, as reflected in Chart 6. On one hand, state laws are strongly
permissive with respect to insurer use of age in life and health insurance.88 In life
insurance 39 jurisdictions permit its use and none specifically limit or prohibit it.
In health insurance, 36 jurisdictions—more than two-thirds—permit the use of age
87

Most states treat traditional life insurance and annuities similarly in their risk classification regulations.
In fact, Chart 3 showed that age is the only characteristic that, on average, leans towards being expressly
permitted for any line of coverage. This is true for both health insurance and life insurance.
88
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by insurance companies, while only 11 strongly limit its use.89 Starting in 2014
federal healthcare reform will limit differentials in premiums based on age to no
more than a ratio of 3 to 1.90 On the other hand, age is more restricted in auto and
property/casualty lines of insurance. Most states are on the restrictive side of the
chart in these lines, with twenty-five having only general unfair discrimination
rules applying to age.91 Finally, most jurisdictions do not mention age in their
disability insurance laws, or only provide a general restriction.92 Overall, disability
insurance is another non-restrictive line of insurance with the unique fact that most
states (twenty six) do not mention anything at all.

89

Notably, eleven jurisdictions strongly limit the use of age in health insurance underwriting decisions. See,
e.g., California, Idaho, Illinois, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Vermont.
90
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii).
91
In auto insurance, only Delaware, Louisiana, and Michigan permit the use of age, five others have no-law-onpoint, and the rest are roughly equally distributed between the four restrictive categories. Even in jurisdictions that
expressly prohibit the use of age, younger drivers may pay higher automobile insurance premiums if insurers are
allowed to rate based on the number of years of driving experience. See, e.g., 10 COLO . CODE REGS. § 2632.4(a)
(forbidding discrimination on the basis of age and many other characteristics); C AL. I NS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(3)
(allowing use of the number of years of driving experience). And states that have a specific restriction may permit
the use of age under certain circumstances, like if there is a proven correlation between accident rate and the
characteristic. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 2331 (forbidding the state approval of auto insurance plans that consider
age, gender, or marital status, “unless such filing is supported by and reflective of actuarially sound statistical data”).
92
No state prohibits the use of age in disability insurance and only three states strongly limit it (Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Texas).
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Chart 6: Distribution of States’ Scores for Age, by Insurance Line

Because the patterns of cross-line variation with respect to age match the
broader patterns of cross line variation, our model can explain these findings in the
same way that it explains the broader cross-line variation described in Part B. But
prong three of our model also helps to explain the more specific fact that state
regulation of age is particularly permissive in the context of health and life
insurance. Regulatory restrictions on the use of age in the context of health and
life insurance would raise particularly large adverse selection concerns. This is
because the magnitude of the correlation between age and death/illness is very
large and very well understood by policyholders. Indeed, the connections between
age, on the one hand, and the risks of illness and death, on the other, are so
intuitive that many deaths and illnesses (such as dehydration) are simply attributed
to “old age.”93

93

Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic
Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980) (“Age discrimination is so basic in life insurance and annuities that any
serious challenge to it seems unlikely.”).
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Admittedly, our model does have trouble explaining one element of the
cross-line regulation of age: the lack of state law specifically regulating the use of
age in disability insurance. Prong one could explain this finding if age had no
predictive value in disability insurance. But this seems unlikely, although the
nature of the connection between age and disability is certainly less clear than it is
in the context of health, life, and auto insurance.
4. Cross-Line Treatment of Credit Score
The cross-line treatment of credit score discrimination matches the larger
trends seen across all characteristics: it is most heavily regulated in auto and
property/casualty and less heavily regulated in life, health and disability. Aside
from demonstrating this fact, Chart 7 also shows that insurers’ use of credit score is
specifically addressed by almost every state in property/casualty and auto
insurance.94 By contrast, many state laws generally do not specifically address the
use of credit score in health, life, and disability insurance, where the majority of
the laws are coded as either a “0” or a “1.” Where this is not the case, states
explicitly permit the use of credit score, and few explicitly restrict it.

94

In auto insurance, the only jurisdiction that does not mention credit score is the District of Columbia.
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Chart 7: Distribution of States’ Scores for Credit Score, by Insurance Line
Once again, these findings are broadly consistent with both general trends
and our explanations for these general trends. But our model also provides some
more nuanced explanation for these findings. In particular, the fact that credit
score is so rarely mentioned in state laws governing health, life, and disability, but
specifically addressed in auto and property/casualty, is quite consistent with prong
one of our model, the predictive property. Put quite simply, credit score has
repeatedly been shown to predict losses in property/casualty and auto insurance. 95
However, we are unaware of any research suggesting that credit score is a useful
predictor of risk in other lines of insurance. Indeed, insurers in these three lines of
insurance have not historically used credit information in their underwriting

95

See Credit-Based Insurance Scores: Impacts on Consumers of Automobile Insurance: A Report to Congress
by
the
Federal
Trade
Commission
(Jul.
2007),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-Based_Insurance_Scores.pdf
(discussing
widespread use of credit scores in auto and homeowners). The reason why, however, is not well understood.
According to the National Association of Independent Insurers, at least, “people who manage their personal finances
responsibly tend to manage other important aspects of their life with that same level of responsibility and that would
include being responsible behind the wheel of their car or being responsible in maintaining their home.”
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practices.96 Thus, there was never a need to restrict the usage of credit score in
these lines.97
Our model also explains why the regulation of credit score in property
casualty and automobile insurance tends to hover around a strong limitation (“3”)
rather than a prohibition (“4”) in our data. Our second prong, the illicit
discrimination property, suggests that there is a rationale for strong regulation in
this domain. The core justification for regulating credit score is that it is not
causally linked to risk and instead serves as a proxy for socially suspect
characteristics like race and income. At the same time, adverse selection, our third
prong, at least mildly pushes against the outright prohibition of credit score. The
result is a strong prohibition with some states explicitly prohibiting this practice.
5. Cross-Line Treatment of Race, Religion, and Ethnicity
Chart 3 above showed that race, ethnicity, and religion (the “big three”) are
the most intensely restricted characteristics in every line of insurance, with
sometimes a full one-point difference between them and the next most restricted
characteristic, namely gender. 98 Surprisingly, though, states do not uniformly
prohibit insurers from using race, religion, and ethnicity, a fact we explore at
length in related work.99 For present purposes, the key issue is the variation in
states’ regulation of the “big three,” which resembles the broader cross-line trends:
property/casualty insurance is the most restrictive line of insurance, then auto,
health, life and lastly disability insurance.

96

See NAIC, Credit Reports and Insurance Underwriting, White Paper (1997) (“As reported by the American
Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), life and health insurers
do not use credit reports of the type that are used to establish a person's eligibility for credit…”); Christopher Cruise,
How
Credit
Score
Affects
Insurance
Rates,
B ANKRATE .COM
(2003),
available
at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/insurance/credit-scores1.asp (“So far, spokesmen at the trade associations for
health and life underwriters say they don't know of any of their members use credit scoring in underwriting and
pricing policies…”).
97
There is some anecdotal evidence that life, disability, and health insurers may be experimenting with using
credit score to rate policyholders. If so, then this suggests that states should be cautious in restricting limitations on
insurance underwriting to lines in which carriers presently use the characteristic at issue. Doing so can produce
unjustified discrepancies in legal restrictions if insurers’ underwriting patterns change.
98
Id. Interestingly, the prohibition on using religious affiliation is stricter on average than the prohibition on
using race or ethnicity.
99
See Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Law, supra.
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Chart 8: Distribution of States’ Scores for Race, by Insurance Line
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Chart 9: Distribution of States’ Scores for Ethnicity, by Insurance Line
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Chart 10: Distribution of States’ Scores for Religion, by Insurance Line
At least with respect to the big three, however, we think that the best
explanation for this pattern is not the adverse selection property, which was the
principal explanation we offered for cross-line variation that was no trait specific.
Instead, it is likely that the patterns found in each of the charts above are better
explained by prong 1 of our model: the predictive property. 100 There is substantial
historical precedent for homeowner and automobile insurers using race, or proxies
for race, ethnicity, and religion in their underwriting.101 By contrast, there is much
less historical precedent for race, ethnicity, or religion ever been used in health,
life, or disability insurance, and it is not immediately clear that these factors would
offer much predictive value to insurers even if they were to use them.102

100

To be sure, there are other potential explanations. For instance, perhaps state regulators and their
constituents are under the mis-impression that federal law already bans the use of these characteristics in all lines of
insurance.
101
See, e.g., insurance redlining literature.
102
The one exception was industrial life insurance, which amounts to a form of burial insurance. For years this
insurance was classified according to race, which apparently was never considered illegal, but the practice died out
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If at all, the question is why not every state in the country prohibits the use
of race, ethnicity, and religion. In other words, why do some states just limit the
use of race? In our previous paper we offered a number of theories. Perhaps state
regulators and their constituents are under the impression that federal law already
bans the use of these characteristics. Or, maybe state legislatures that have not
adopted bans for the big three are of the view that insurers have stopped using race,
ethnicity, and religion already and thus that a law prohibiting their use would
simply be unnecessary.
We are still left with a puzzle though: why are auto and property/casualty
more prohibitive of using the “big three” for risk classification purposes than
health, life, and disability. Like in the case of credit score above we believe that
adverse selection does not provide an adequate answer. Even if these
characteristics have predictive value for health, life, or disability insurance, unlike
the case of credit score none of these lines actually permits taking these
characteristics into account. We therefore believe that the best explanation is that
these characteristics fall under the general restrictions rules (coded as 1), which
explains the low average score.
6. Cross-Line Treatment of Zip Code

some thirty years ago. J. Gabriel McGlamery, Raced Based Underwriting and the Death of Burial Insurance,15
CONN. INS. L. J. 531 (2009).
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Chart 11: Distribution of States’ Scores for Zip Code, by Insurance Line
States’ regulation of discrimination on the basis of policyholder zip code
varies along the same lines that generic antidiscrimination rules vary across lines:
it is regulated most restrictively in property/casualty insurance and least
restrictively in health and disability insurance. Chart 11 demonstrates this fact,
while revealing that state laws specifically mentioning zip code are much more
common in auto, property/casualty, and health insurance than they are in life and
disability insurance. Chart 11 also shows that almost 20 states explicitly permit
health insurers to classify policyholders’ risks based on their zip code, compared
with only five states which permit it in automobile insurance, and only one in
property/casualty insurance.
Once again, these results are consistent with our model. First, the fact that
state law specifically mentions zip code much more frequently in health,
property/casualty, and auto than in disability and life insurance is consistent with
Prong 1 of our model. Zip code has clear predictive value in the lines where states
tend to regulate it. Thus, zip code is quite relevant to health insurance risk, as there
40
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is substantial geographical variation in the general cost level of medical services in
different geographic area. 103 Zip code also has predictive value for
property/casualty insurance because it can provide information about the risk of
fire, the likelihood of theft, the cost of rebuilding, and numerous other factors that
are constitutive of a homeowner’s risk.104 Similarly, zip code can help predict auto
policyholders’ risk because it provides information about traffic patterns, density,
and risk of loss. 105 Indeed, the vast majority of states do not leave zip code
unregulated in auto insurance. Therefore the first prong of our model is helpful in
explaining the variation in zip code regulations. By contrast, it is unclear whether
zip code has any capacity to predict risk for disability and life insurance (at least
once other underwriting factors are used).106
As for the disparate treatment of zip code for health insurance, on the one
hand, and automobile and property/casualty insurance on the other, this too is
consistent with our model. The relatively strong restrictions on using zip code in
automobile and homeowners insurance stems from the fact that commentators and
consumer groups have argued that zip codes are, or in the past have been, used by
insurers as proxies in the home and auto insurance context for socially suspect
characteristics, such as race. Although the same concern might apply in the health
insurance domain, adverse selection pushes in the opposite direction given the
large geographical variation in the costs of health care. The magnitude of that
variation makes adverse selection a much larger threat.107
7. Cross-Line Treatment of Sexual Orientation
As Chart 12 shows, the most restrictive line with respect to sexual
orientation is health, followed by life insurance. By contrast, sexual orientation is
less regulated in auto, property/casualty, and disability insurance, with many states
having a no-law score with respect to sexual orientation.
103

Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
The ISO evaluates public fire protection capabilities. See http://www.iso.com/faq/ISO-FAQ/The-PublicProtection-Classification-PPC-Program.html.
105
http://www.latimes.com/business/custom/yourmoney/la-fi-lazarus6apr06,0,693725.column?page=2
106
Mortality and disability rates should also depend on crime rates and accident rates, both of which depend on
zip code.
107
See Part I.
104
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Chart 12: Distribution of States’ Scores for Sexual Orientation, by Insurance Line
Once again, these results are largely consistent with our model. First, it is
quite clear that sexual orientation has no predictive power with respect to auto,
prop/casualty and disability. This explains why a number of states in these lines of
insurance have no law on point (our first prong). By contrast, at several points in
recent history sexual orientation was perceived to have predictive power with
respect to healthcare costs and an increased mortality rate via its perceived
association (whether empirically proven or not) with AIDS. This explains why all
states in health and life insurance chose to regulate it. Second, sexual orientation
has over the past decades become recognized as deserving protection against
discrimination, as discussed above. 108 Thus, there is a strong fairness based
argument that sexual orientation should not be used in the lines where it does have
perceived predictive power: life and health insurance. Third, the number of
individuals who actually are gay and have AIDS is quite small relative to the
aggregate pool of policyholders. As a result, prohibiting discrimination on this
basis is unlikely to cause any substantial amounts of adverse selection.
108

See Part III.A.
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Conclusion
Insurance regulations vary between states, between characteristics, and
between insurance lines. This Article has presented empirical findings that
demonstrate a tremendous amount of cross-line and cross-characteristic variation
in insurance regulation. Although one might expect that states would subject a
characteristic to the same amount of regulation for all insurance lines, this is not
the case.
Yet both the cross-line and cross-characteristic variation that we do find is
hardly random. In fact, most of this variation, we argue, can be explained by a
simply three-pronged model that emphasizes the predictive value of a
characteristic in a particular line, the extent to which that characteristic is socially
illicit, and the risk that limiting discrimination on the basis of that characteristic
will result in adverse selection. Although this reduced-form model cannot
perfectly explain variation in state insurance anti-discrimination law, it comes quite
close to doing so.
This Article thus provides a reasonably simple model that explains much of
insurance anti-discrimination law in practice. By focusing on our three-prong
model—the predictive property, the adverse-selection property, and the illicitdiscrimination property—we should be able to predict the shape of insurance antidiscrimination law in other contexts. Take, for example, the characteristic of
marital status. We happen to know that some states regulate insurers’ use of this
characteristic, although we have made no systematic study of the issue. Based on
the findings of this Article, however, we would predict that the pattern of state
regulations affecting insurers’ use of marital status would turn on the three prongs
we have identified.
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